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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Foreign capital and institutional quality simultaneously play an important role in 
the development process of low-income countries. By and large developing nations fell 
short of funds necessary to spur the economic growth. Along with this constraint, they are 
facing the down fall in the quality of governance. Low earned revenues and high 
government expenditure increase the reliance upon the foreign capital mostly in the form 
of foreign aid and external debt.  Just the availability of foreign funds is not sufficient to 
stimulate the economic growth, there is a need of good governance along with better 
quality of institutions that will act as a catalyst and improves the efficiency of capital, 
[see for instance, Agnor and Montiel (2010)]. Good governance establishes impartial, 
predictable and consistently enforced rules in the form of institutions and thus crucial for 
the sustained growth [North (1990 and 1992)]. Those countries which have good 
institutions show positive growth rates whenever the stock of capital increases but the 
countries with bad institutions, increase in capital investment may lead to negative 
growth rates due to rent seeking and other unproductive activities, Hall, et al. (2010). In 
this context, North (1992) argues that the institutions as well as the ideology shape 
economic performance. While taking into account the technology used, institutions affect 
economic performance by determining the cost of transaction and production. Formal 
rules, informal constraints and characteristics of enforcing those constraints together 
formulate the institutions. Institutions affect economic performance and the differential in 
performance of economies is basically influenced by the way institutions evolve. The 
neoclassical economic theory is of little help in investigating the sources beneath 
economic performance because institutions are taken for granted in their models Agnor 
and Montiel (2010). Factor and product markets perform efficiently in the presence of 
good political and economic institutions that ensure low transaction costs and credible 
commitment. However, empirical facts of developing countries show a positive 
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correlation between per capital economic growth and quality of institutions in terms of 
good governance. Figure 1 strongly illustrates this fact, where average index of 
governance across host of developing countries is positively correlated with average 
growth per capita over the sample of 1984 to 2010. 
 
Fig. 1.  Scatter Plot (Economic Growth and Governance Relationship) 
 
  
While analysing economic growth and governance nexus, earlier recent studies [for 
example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) and Hall, et al. (2010)] are of the view that the 
difference in the economic performance is primarily due to the differences in the economic 
institutions. Countries with poor economic institutions have to focus on the reformulation of 
these institutions. Unfortunately, it is not an easy task as economic institutions are collective 
choices generated by the political process. The economic institutions depend on the political 
institutions as well as the distribution of political power in a country. The knowledge 
regarding the key factors that direct a society into a political equilibrium and hold up fine 
economic institutions is preliminary. However, it is clear that institutional equilibrium 
depends highly on the political environment so this political nature makes it very hard to 
restructure economic institutions. There are countries that go through political evolution, 
reformulate their institutional framework and for better development outcomes.  
Foreign aid and external debt has controversial impact on the economic growth of 
developing nations as found in the empirical economic literature. In the context of 
external debt and economic growth nexus, there exists different hypothesis like, Liquidity 
Constraint Hypothesis (LCH), Debt Overhang Hypothesis (DOH) and Direct Effect of 
Debt Hypothesis (DEDH). According to the Debt Overhang Hypothesis (DOH) that if the 
existing debt is high then it will make people to think of high future taxes so they would 
not like to save and invest more.
1
  Economists test the DOH and conclude that high level 
of debt reduces the investment in an economy and it will definitely dampen the economic 
 
1See for example, Krugman (1988), Corden (1988), Sachs (1989) and Froot (1989). 
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growth.
2
 While according to Liquidity Constraint Hypothesis (LOH) the debt service 
payments in case of highly indebted countries are very high and it trim down the funds 
that can be used to augment investment, Hoffman and Reisen (1991). Empirical findings 
also favour LOH as the high debt service payments crowd out the investment and 
slowdowns the process of economic growth.
3
  Direct Effect of Debt Hypothesis (DEDH) 
states that high level of debt may even reduce the productivity of the existing capital that 
will decrease the level of output, Fosu (1996). Motivating from these different 
hypothesis, we computed simple correlation for host of sixty developing countries. The 
countries have been classified into three sub-groups, low-income countries, low-middle 
income countries and upper-middle income countries. The correlation results are given in 
the form of scatter-plots, see Figure 2. These scatter plots clearly show negative 
associations between external debt and economic growth per capita across all sub-groups.  
Alongside these linkages of external debt and economic growth, empirical literature 
also provides mix evidences of positive and negative relationship between foreign aid on 
economic growth. We can observe both kinds of relationships among these variables with the 
help of the following simple correlation scatter plots (as given in Figure 2). 
 





Data Source: World Development Indicators  
Country Group Classification:  
LIC: low income countries, MIC: middle income countries, and UMIC: upper middle income countries   
 
2Notable studies are: DeMelo (1990), Fainy and Fry (1989) and IMF (1989). 
3See for instance, Presbitero (2005), Hansen (2004), Clements, et al. (2003), Cohen (1993) and 
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We argue the positive channel works only in the presence of good macroeconomic 
policies and sound state institutions. Many empirical studies also highlight this point.
4
 In 
the presence of good economic policies, foreign aid encourages the development process 
that will definitely improves the investment climate and generate more tax revenues in 
the long run. Now there is a question of its effective utilisation in promoting growth 
process. It is also argue that foreign aid can also help to improve the governance quality 
by removing the constraints regarding the low tax revenues and makes possible for 
government to invest on those activities that improve the quality of bureaucracy, reduce 
corruption and enforce rule of law.
5
  
Despite the positive linkages of foreign aid, it may affect the economic growth 
negatively. In rent seeking societies, governments are not accountable toward the general 
public and can use the foreign aid in wasteful activities and increase the level of 
corruption. It will not invest in those activities that improve the institutional quality and 
economic policies; this leads to the down fall of economic activity as now people would 
not like to invest [Rodrik (1996)]. Oechslin (2006) on the other hand analyses the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in promote economic growth in economies that may grow 
faster by the adoption of productive technologies. If the government invests more in 
judiciary it will translate into better enforcement of contracts between the foreign 
technology supplier and the domestic firms that will lead to rapid growth. But if the 
government is self-interested then the additional resources to overcome the financing gap 
may not be able to establish better institutions. Higher inflows may worsen the political 
instability that may harm the economy whose performance is comparatively sound. But 
countries with low institutional quality may perform well whenever such inflows 
increase.  
It becomes apparent as to why the literature does not provide a robust empirical 
association among foreign aid effectiveness, external debt and economic growth while 
taking into consideration the institutional quality. This point motivates us to analyse 
empirically the effect of external debt and foreign aid on the economic growth in a panel 
of developing countries, which mainly suffered from low level of governance. The rest of 
the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses relevant literature review. Section 3 
describes model specification, the choice of variables, data sources and selection criterion 
for countries under analysis. Estimation results are discussed in Section 4. Last section 
concludes the study. 
 
2.  REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Substantial work has been done that links individually external debt, foreign aid 
and governance with economic growth. In some papers foreign aid as well as external 
debt have been related to economic growth taking into account the quality of governance. 
But little attempt is made to consider the simultaneous impact of these three variables on 
economic growth. This is the sole reason due to which this section has been divided into 
different parts. The first section describes the literature linking foreign aid to economic 
 
4See for instance, Alvi, et el. (2008), Oechslin (2006), Islam (2005), Feeny (2005), Easterly, et al. 
(2004), Dalgaard, et al. (2004) and Burnside and Dollar (2000). 
5Notable studies which argue it are: Easterly (2003); Islam (2003); Svensson, (2000a) and Dollar and 
Pritchett (1998). 
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growth. The second and the third sections present the literature review of the impact of 
external debt and institutions on the economic growth respectively.  
 
2.1.  Governance and Economic Growth 
Decker and Lim (2008) examine various elementary drivers of economic growth 
focusing in particle on political as well as the economic institutions. Whereas controlling 
for geographic endowments and economic integration, the distinction between the two 
types of institution makes it possible to determine the inferior or superior performance of 
an economy based on either or both of these two types of institutions. The core empirical 
model is that of Rodrik, et al. (2004) with some variations to accommodate the dynamic 
aspects. The results show that political-economic institutions play a significant positive 
role in determining the level of income while the political institutions (democracy) are 
insignificant may be due to the non-linearity of the development of democratic rights. 
Developing countries should pay more attention to political-economic institutions like the 
rule of law [La Porta, et al. (1998)] and the enforcement of property rights [Djankov, et 
al. (2002)] to stimulate economic growth rather than concentrating on political 
institutions.  
Dawson (1998) analyses the alternative channels through which institutions impact 
economic growth.  This paper formalises the alternative channels i.e., whether institutions 
directly affect the long-run growth by enhancing total factor productivity or indirectly 
through investment channel. In this context, basic theoretical framework used by Dawson 
is an extension of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil’s (1992) human capital augmented version 
of the Solow (1956) model. Empirical evidence indicates that institutions have a 
significant positive impact on economic growth in case of large sample size. The results 
are robust for alternative specifications that ensure the absence of reverse causation and 
there exists no significant difference among results of both pure panel and cross-sectional 
data analysis. The study concludes that institutions stimulate economic growth directly by 
raising the total factor productivity as well as indirectly by enhancing the investment. 
Recent studies indicate that even increase in capital does not ensure the high levels of 
output so there is a need to examine the role of institutions. Hall, et al. (2010) follows 
Dawson (1998) in augmenting the growth model of Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) to 
incorporate the quality of country’s institutions. They try to investigate the role of 
institutions in determining economic growth by considering investment in physical and 
human capital. Results show that institutions are positively linked with the output growth.  
Feld and Kirchgassner (2008) conduct a survey of recent empirical studies on 
institutions and economic growth and conclude that from the experience of Germany and 
Korea after World War II, we can hardly deny the vital role played by institutions in 
promoting the economic growth but the literature that has been reviewed in this paper is 
mostly inconclusive. Nearly every paper argues that its results are more efficient and 
significant but their statistical significance, selection of variables as well as the measures 
used for institutional quality are questionable. Actually, the question regarding the 
effectiveness of institutions is debatable. Not only the institutions matter for growth, but 
also the governance and human capital matter a lot. Today mostly economists are of the 
view that the economic institutions matter more for economic development rather than 
the political institutions. But we should not ignore the political institutions as well 
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because the political instability is negatively related to growth of output. So economic 
development needs economically as well as politically stable environment for proper 
functioning of the market mechanism. 
 
2.2.  Debt and Economic Growth 
Chowdhury (2000), Sachs (1990), Kenen (1990) and Bulow and Rogoff (1990) 
examines the key analytical issue of whether external debt burden is a symptom or a 
cause of economic slowdown. Sachs (1990) and Kenen (1990) are of the view that the 
external debt overhang is a main root cause of economic slowdown. Bulow and Rogoff 
(1990) argue that the external debt is a symptom of bad economic management and 
performance and it’s not a primary cause of economic growth. Chowdhury (2000) does 
not find any evidence that supports the propositions of Bulow-Rogoff and Kenen-Sachs. 
Were (2001) states that external debt stock has a negative impact on private 
investment and economic growth; this verifies the presence of debt overhang problem in 
Kenya. In addition the current debt inflows stimulate the private investment, debt service 
payments do not appear to effect growth negatively but has some crowding out affect on 
private investment. Fosu (1996) argues that even if the debt has little impact on the rate 
of investment it is possible that external debt adversely impacts on economic growth 
through declining the productivity of capital. Hameed, et al. (2008) argue that the debt 
servicing burden has a negative impact on the productivity of capital and labour, which in 
turn adversely affect economic growth. Debt service ratio affects the GDP negatively and 
thereby the long run economic growth which weakens the debt servicing ability of a 
country. Malik, et al. (2010) findings are also on the same lines as that of Hameed, et al. 
(2008). 
Xiaoyong and Gong (2007) work out the inter-linkages between foreign aid, 
domestic capital accumulation and external debt. They argue that in the long run 
domestic capital accumulates, consumption increases and the external debt decrease 
whenever there is a permanent increase in foreign aid. In the short run the comparative 
static analysis shows that a representative agent becomes more patient and initially the 
investment increases and external debt declines if the foreign aid level increases. This 
study also provides basic support regarding a significant impact of foreign aid on the 
economic growth and development in the case of developing countries. Many empirical 
studies on external finance and its impact on domestic savings, investment and economic 
growth have been supported by theoretical findings of  Cui Xiaoyong and Liutang Gong, 
such as those of Burnaside and Dollar (2000, 2004), Svensson (2003), Collier and Dollar 
(2001, 2002) and Collier and Dehn (2001).  
 
2.3.  Foreign Aid and Economic Growth 
Dalgaard, et al. (2004) theoretically as well as empirically analyse the 
effectiveness of foreign aid using Overlapping Generation Model (OLG). The study 
shows that in general foreign aid affects long run productivity but the magnitude and path 
of impact may depend on policies, size of foreign aid inflows and organisational 
characteristics. In the existing empirical literature there is no consensus on the role of 
policy and foreign aid on economic performance. Conflicting and contradicting results 
prevails that create a lot of confusion among economists. Boone (1995) is of the view that 
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the foreign aid just increases the size of government while it fails to enhance investment 
and economic growth significantly. Oechslin (2006) finds that during 1980s and 1990s 
foreign aid makes the political system to be more unstable. The results lay emphasis on 
the ineffectiveness of foreign aid in the current institutional scenario and there exists 
decreasing returns to scale in higher foreign aid inflows. Lensink and Morrissey (2000) 
argue that uncertainty on the magnitude and timings of foreign aid implies negative 
impact on the investment that in turn may dampen the economic performance of a 
country. 
Alvi, et al. (2008) assess the role of policy and foreign aid in promoting economic 
growth when the inter-linkage among them is nonlinear. The parametric and semi-
parametric estimations show that the policy plays an important role in the economic growth 
of a country. Foreign aid successfully boosts up the growth activity in the presence of good 
policy environment. Burnside and Dollar (2000) investigate the relationship between 
foreign aid, policy and growth of per capita GDP. They find that in case of developing 
countries that have good fiscal, monetary and trade policies, foreign aid has a positive 
impact on the economic growth as the coefficient of interaction term between foreign aid 
and policy is significant. In the presence of bad economic policies foreign aid does not 
affect growth positively, and these results are robust for various specifications that either 
include or exclude middle income countries, outliers and consider policy variables as 
exogenous and endogenous. Easterly, et al. (2004) reassess linkage between foreign aid and 
economic growth given good policies using the methodology of Burnside and Dollar 
(2000). The study reconstructs the data base from original sources and makes extension by 
considering both the cross-section and the time series dimensions; enlarging the sample size 
from 275 observations to 356 by adding six more countries ranging from 1970–1997.  The 
study does not test the robustness of the results provided by Burnside and Dollar to a 
substantial number of variations; they just include those observations that were not 
available to Burnside and Dollar. The results if confined to the original limited data, show 
same outcomes as presented by Burnside and Dollar but when the extended sample is used 
the interaction term of aid and policy becomes insignificant and its coefficient changes its 
sign from positive to negative. Easterly, et al. conclude that the interaction term is not 
robust to the extended sample size so it’s not necessary that foreign aid enhance growth just 
in the presence of good policy environment. Murphy and Tresp (2006) update and modify 
data set originally used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) by taking into account the critique 
presented by Easterly, et al. (2004). The results show that the relationship among foreign 
aid policy and growth is quite fragile and depends significantly on the set of countries being 
included in the analysis. When the sample size that has been used by Burnside and Dollar is 
considered, policy plays an important role in determining the effectiveness of foreign aid in 
generating economic growth, but this relationship vanishes in case of expanded sample size 
of countries. The results prove that the critique proposed by Easterly, et al. (2004) is correct 
and little evidence is there which supports the view that good policy enhances the 
probability of foreign aid to contribute positively to economic growth. Islam (2005)  states 
that on average foreign aid has no significant impact on the growth irrespective of the 
policies whether good or bad but the political stability is a determining factor that makes the 
foreign aid flows effective in promoting economic growth. Feeny (2005) also investigates 
foreign aid effectiveness and economic growth conditioned upon the level of economic 
policy and governance. The study concludes that foreign aid has little impact on economic 
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growth of Papua New Ghana (PNG) but in case of World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme financed through foreign aid some evidence emerges that supports the 
hypothesis of foreign aid’s positive impact on economic growth. The governance level has 
no impact on economic growth of PNG but the structural adjustment policies seem to be 
more effective in enhancing the growth being financed by the foreign aid.   
 
3.  EMPIRICAL MODELING SETUP 
In order to present empirical model, we have extended the neo-classical growth 
model of Solow-Swan. Consider the economy production function depends on Capital 
(K), Labour (L) and exogenous technological parameter (A) as: 
))(),(()()( tLtKFtAtY     … … … … … … (1) 
Where K(t) = Capital Stock at time t. 
 L(t) = Labour (Aggregate Labour) at time t. 
 A(t) = Total Factor Productivity or Solow Residual at time t. 
Consider, economy wide production function (1) is represented by standard Cobb-
Douglas form, then:                         
 1)()()()( tLtKtAtY
  … … … … … … (2) 
Where, 0<<1, is capital share and (1– ) is labour share. Intensive form of the equation 
(2) is as:
 
 )()()( tktAty  … … … … … … … (3) 
  ))((' tkf 1)()(  tktA  > 0,  and 0)()1()())(( 2  tktAtkf ,  












This implies that Cobb-Douglas form satisfies the properties of neo-classical 
production function. Equation of motion of Capital stock is given as: 
)().())((.)( tkntkfstk   … … … … … (4)  
Substitute  )())(()( tAktkfty in Equation (4), we get: 
)().()().(.)( tkntktAstk    … … … … … (5) 
The term )( n on the right hand side of equation can be thought as the effective 
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Since we know that  )()()( tktAty or 1)()()(   tktAty , Rearranging again 
and get the following equation: 




















 … … … … … (6) 
Where ))((' tkf 1)(  tkA    
The above model generality mimics the following form of growth rate of output 
per capita which depends on the parameters of the model as: 
 
)),(,,,()()( ntAsgtyty   … … … … … (7) 
In addition following standard literature on worker remittances, it is assumed that 
aggregate productivity (A(t)) depends positively on governance, G, foreign aid, FA and 
negatively related with external debt ED. Therefore, we will assume the following: 
( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( ))A t g G t FA t ED t  … … … … … (8) 
Therefore, 
( ) ( ) ( , , , ( ), ( ), ( ))y t y t g s G t FA t ED t    … … … … (9) 
This reduced form version of behavioural relationship between economic growth, 
foreign aid and external debt with a role of governance help us to write empirical version 
of model given as: 
it it it it j jit it i it
j
y FA ED G X y              … … … (10) 
Where, X is a vector of control variables. 
 
3.1.  Data Description and Sources  
The data sample consists of sixty developing countries that utilise foreign aid and 
external debt to fulfil the requirements for additional capital. Although data for economic 
growth are available for almost all the developing countries but the data for other 
variables like foreign aid, debt, governance and other control variables are not available 
for all the developing countries, this is the sole reason for the selection of sample of sixty 
countries. All the data in annual frequency have been taken from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by the PRS 
Group. Due to the lack of earlier data for the quality of Governances, this analysis covers 
the period 1984 to 2010. The detailed description of variables with data sources and list 
of developing countries has been shown in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. 
 
3.2.  Summary Statistics 
Table 3 describes the summary statistics i.e. mean, median, standard deviation, 
skewness etc. for all the variables.  Table 4 and Table 5 explain the correlation matrix and  
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Table 1 
 Description of Variables 
S. 
No. Variable Description / Source 
1. Economic 
Growth 
GDP per capita growth (% annual). /WDI 
2. Foreign Aid Net Official development assistance as a percentage of GNI. /WDI 
3. External Debt Total debt service as a percentage of GNI. /WDI 
4. Governance 
Quality 
ICRG Composite index of bureaucracy quality, Rule of law and 
corruption, annual data (0-18 point scale)/PRS Group. 
5. Financial 
Depth 
Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GNI. / WDI 
6. Investment Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GNI. /WDI 
7. Labour Force Total labour force/Total Population. /WDI 
8. Inflation GDP deflator. /WDI 
9. Trade 
Openness 
Sum of Imports and Exports as a ratio of GDP. /WDI 
 
Table 2 
List of Developing Countries 
 Algeria Ghana Panama 
Bangladesh Guatemala Paraguay 
Bolivia Kenya Peru 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Pakistan 
Brazil Guyana Papua New Guinea 
Burkina Faso Honduras Philippines 
Cameroon India Senegal 
Chile Indonesia Sierra Leone 
Colombia Iran Sudan 
Congo Jamaica Sri Lanka 
Congo, DR Jordan Syria 
Costa Rica Madagascar Uruguay 
Cote d'Ivoire Malawi Thailand 
Dominican Republic Malaysia Togo 
Ecuador Mali Tunisia 
Egypt Mexico Turkey 
El Salvador Morocco Uganda 
Ethiopia Mozambique Venezuela 
Gabon Nicaragua Zambia 
Gambia Niger Zimbabwe 
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Table 3 
Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Y 1.47 1.95 21.76 –29.48 4.42 
GOV 7.88 8.00 14.50 0.00 2.63 
ODA 7.20 3.16 98.75 –0.73 10.44 
ED 6.08 4.95 107.47 0.03 5.70 
LF 39.63 40.14 57.30 20.11 6.20 
M2 39.72 32.44 158.26 –1.08 26.31 
INV 19.92 20.04 52.47 –12.32 7.23 
INF 120.77 8.68 66212.30 –9.81 2316.93 




  Y GOV ODA ED INV LF M2 INF TO 
Y 1.00 
        GOV 0.17 1.00 
       ODA –0.07 –0.24 1.00 
      ED –0.08 0.08 0.15 1.00 
     INV 0.24 0.26 –0.19 0.13 1.00 
    LF 0.09 0.00 0.03 –0.05 0.03 1.00 
   M2 0.10 0.33 –0.30 0.18 0.37 –0.08 1.00 
  INF –0.11 –0.04 0.02 –0.03 –0.08 0.07 0.05 1.00 




  Y GOV ODA ED INV LF M2 INF TO 
Y 19.3 
        GOV 1.9 6.7 
       ODA –3.1 –6.6 111.0 
      ED –2.0 1.2 9.0 32.8 
     INV 7.5 4.9 –14.4 5.4 52.4 
    LF 2.4 -0.1 2.2 –1.9 1.3 38.2 
   M2 11.9 22.4 –84.7 27.8 70.0 –12.9 699.1 
  INF –1122.2 –236.1 499.6 –410.4 –1289.7 989.2 3197.0 5364739.0 
 TO 12.6 10.3 –15.3 61.3 114.1 30.7 470.6 2222.7 1519.3 
 
covariance matrix. From correlation matrix it is depicted that governance, investment, 
labour force, M2, inflation and trade openness is positively correlated with the per capita 
income. This indicates the fact that whenever there is an increase in these variables it will 
enhance the per capita income of an economy. It becomes more evident from Table 4 that 
the foreign aid and external debt affect the per capita income adversely; it looks like a 
burden on the economy. The covariance matrix also explains the results in a similar 
manner, foreign aid and external debt covariate with per capita income negatively while 
all the other variables covariate positively. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This section explains in detail the empirical model’s interpretation and its 
robustness in a subsequent manner.  
 
4.1.  Results of Hausman Test 
The basic empirical model has been estimated using fixed effect method as well as 
Random effect method, results are shown in Table 6. To check out which method is more 
appropriate Hausman test that is among the widely used class of tests in the subject of 
econometrics, has been applied. The underlying rationale behind the Hausman test is to 
contrast the two different set of estimates. It compares both the estimation methods in a 
way so that, one set of estimate is consistent under the null as well as the alternative 
hypothesis while the other one is consistent just under the null hypothesis. Larger is the 
distance between the two sets of estimates the evidence will go in favour of alternative 
hypothesis. Table 7 describes the outcome of Hausman test and provides evidence against 
the null hypothesis i.e. random effects are consistent and efficient. 
 
Table 6 
Empirical Findings Dependent Variable (Y) 
Variable 
Fixed Effect Random Effect System GMM 
I II III IV 
GOV 0.1396 0.1647 0.1888 0.6580 
  (2.1139)* (2.903)* (3.8008)* (2.0866)* 
ODA(-1) 0.0640 0.0612 0.0356 0.0804 
  (3.6180)* (3.6709)* (2.7284)* (2.4624)* 
ED –0.0644 –0.0656 –0.0786 –0.0870 
  (–2.7321)* (–2.9116)* (–3.8863)* (–1.9243)** 
INV 0.1729 0.1778 0.1591 0.4309 
  (7.2136)* (8.0980)* (8.6121)* (6.4593)* 
LF 0.2886 0.2631 0.0786 0.3252 
  (5.3878)* (5.7704)* (3.2310)* (4.2038)* 
M2 –0.0546 –0.0505 –0.0073 –0.0823 
  (–5.2490)* (–5.4175)* (–1.2215) (–5.3295)* 
C –12.3470 –11.8083 –5.7582 –21.9748 
  (–5.4708)* (–6.1849)* (–5.1727)* (–4.6133)* 
AR(1) 0.1310       
  (5.0221)*       
R-squared 0.2304 0.2105 0.0774 0.1750 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1950 0.1762 0.0738 0.1376 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0177 1.7345 1.6318 1.5425 
F-statistic 6.5003 6.1314 21.7224   
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
J-statistic       2.079 
No. of Observations 1560 1560 1560 1500 
Note:  All the values in the parenthesis denote the student t-statistics. The * ,**and *** indicates the 




Test Cross-section Random Effects     
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
Cross-section Random 57.996 6.000 0.000 
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4.2.  Model Estimation and Interpretation of Results 
As the Hausman test is in favour of fixed effect method, so the empirical model 
has been estimated using this technique, in order to tackle the issue of endogeneity GMM 
has been applied. Per capita income has been taken as the dependent variable; 
governance, foreign aid and external debt are the main variables of concern while 
investment, labour force and M2 are taken as control variables. Results are described in 
Table 6. The R-square value shows the regression fit and its value is 0.23 and 0.21 in 
Model (I) and Model (II) respectively. Although the value of R-square is low but the 
probability of F-statistics is zero, this ensures the effectiveness of empirical estimates. 
The first and the most important variable of interest is governance, the coefficient 
of governance is positive and also highly significant that shows good governance 
enhances the output. Whenever governance of an economy improves it will definitely 
promote economic growth and the positive sign of coefficient is in accordance with the 
expectations. Improvement in governance means low corruption, high quality of 
bureaucracy and sound rule of law; all of these factors will reduce the economic cost of 
transaction and create a favourable environment for investment.  
The second variable of main concern is aid/GNI; lagged variable of aid/GNI has 
been used that is significant at the level of 1 percent.  The current inflows of foreign aid 
in an economy will not affect economic activities and output immediately, time is 
required for the management and the utilisation of funds that are coming in the form of 
foreign aid. In order to inject these funds in an economy a properly planned projects are 
required, unfortunately in case of developing countries the issue of lack of funding is 
always there and they usually depend on foreign aid for the implementation of new 
projects, but the availability of resources in the form of foreign aid is not guaranteed most 
of the time. All these factors hinder economic growth and provide main reasons due to 
which the lagged values for foreign aid variable has been taken. Whenever there is 1 
percent increase in aid/GNI, it will spur per capita growth rate by 0.064 percent and 
0.0804 percent according to the results estimated through OLS and GMM respectively 
(See, model I and IV). 
The third variable that is especially relevant to this study is the external debt, debt 
service payment/GNI has been taken as proxy for the debt burden and it is affecting the 
economic growth negatively. If debt burden increases by 1 percent it will adversely affect 
economic growth by 0.0644 percent and it is significant at 1 percent using fixed effect 
model.  The coefficient estimated through GMM also indicates that the external debt has 
an adverse effect on economic growth and it is also highly significant. The outflow of 
debt service payments actually reduces the funds that can be alternatively used for 
investment purpose, more indebted an economy is the more will be the debt service 
payment and less will be economic growth. Investment/GNI and labour force/population 
are taken here as control variables that are significant at the level of 1 percent, both have 
positive coefficients, implying any increase in investment activity or labour force will 
boost up economic growth. The results point out that if investment/GNI and labour force 
increase by 1 percent it will amplify economic growth by 0.17 percent and 0.29 percent 
respectively using fixed effect model. The results shown by the GMM are also in line 
with OLS and are highly significant. In the next step, we carried out further estimations 
while augmenting possible interactive terms of governance along with key candidate 
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variables, foreign aid and external debt. Results are reported in Table 8 (Model A and 
Model B). These results signify our key belief that if we control governance level, then 
foreign aid appear to be positively correlated with economic growth, whereas, external 
debt relationship remains negative for the longer term horizon.     
 
Table 8 
Empirical Findings with Governance as Interactive Variables 
Dependent Variable (Y) 
Variable Model A Model B 
C –13.2735 –11.2059 
  (–6.0678)* (–5.2666)* 
GOV 0.1087 0.2382 
  (1.5972). (3.4807)* 
GOV(–1)*ODA(–1) 0.0050   
  (1.9039)***   
GOV*DEBT   –0.0106 
    (–3.0774)* 
INV 0.1816 0.1847 
  (7.5753)* (7.7964)* 
LF 0.3113 0.2502 
  (5.8750)* (4.8233)* 
M2 –0.0563 –0.0562 
  (–5.3842)* (–5.5100)* 
AR(1) 0.1331 0.1385 
  (5.0951)* (5.4369)* 
R-squared 0.2224 0.2210 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1872 0.1871 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.0174 2.0161 
F-statistic 6.3098 6.5204 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Observations 1500 1560 
Note: All the values in the parentheses show the t-statistics. Values that are significant at 1 percent, 5 percent                             
and 10 percent levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
4.3.  Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness 
The results can be challenged potentially, as subject to omitted variable bias. There 
is a possibility of exclusion of those variables that are closely related to the variables 
under study. To check out the robustness of the main variables of interest, sensitivity 
analysis has been conducted by adding and dropping different control variables in the 
basic model. For this purpose ten different regressions using fixed effect method have 
been estimated and the results are shown in Table 9. In model (1) key variables have been 
included in the regression equation and the results do not change in this case. Governance 
and foreign aid have positive  while debt has negative impact on economic growth, all the  
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Table 9 
Robustness Check and Sensitivity Analysis 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
C 0.2728 –2.7274 –10.6444 –12.3470 –10.9403 –2.2382 –8.9625 –1.4400 –3.3434 –2.2008 
 
(0.4528). (–4.4936)* (–5.5585)* (–5.4708)* (–5.6695)* (–3.1969)* (–3.9402)* (–2.1162)** (–5.0884)* (–3.1518)* 
GOV 0.1618 0.1236 0.1456 0.1396 0.1676 0.1418 0.2052 0.1233 0.1206 0.1337 
 
(2.3357)** (2.1571)** (2.5466)* (2.1139)** (2.9592)* (2.4971)** (3.0831)* (2.1635)** (2.1155)** (2.3578)* 
ODA(-1) 0.0808 0.0665 0.0715 0.0644 0.0559 0.0509 0.0688 0.0600 0.0646 0.0527 
 
(4.4030)* (3.9615)* (4.2767)* (3.6178)* (3.3353)* (3.0205)* (3.8114)* (3.5660)* (3.8674)* (3.1349)* 
ED –0.0862 –0.0882 –0.0673 –0.0644 –0.0622 –0.0822 –0.0622 –0.0949 –0.0833 –0.0845 
 
(–3.5810)* (–3.9436)* (–2.9592)* (–2.7321)** (–3.3353)* (–3.6860)* (–2.6065)* (–4.2644)* (–3.7193)* (–3.7981)* 
INV – 0.1666 0.1643 0.1729 0.1539 0.1420 – 0.1711 0.1329 0.1346 
 
  (7.5223)* (7.4597)* (7.2136)* (6,5445)* (6.0267)*   (7.6982)* (5.5936)* (5.7022)* 
LF – – 0.1920 0.2886 0.2280 – 0.2242 – – – 
 
    (4.3561)* (5.3878)* (4.8339)*   (4.0037)*       
M2 – – – –0.0546 –0.0562 –0.0462 –0.0587 –0.0319 – –0.0432 
 
      (–5.2490)* (–5.8992)* (–4.9364)* (–5.4394)* (–3.5094)* –  (–4.6036)* 
TO – – – – 0.0179 0.0260 0.0326 – 0.0192 0.0270 
 
        (2.8104)* (4.2092)* (4.7912)*   (3.2175)* (4.3840)* 
INF – – – – – – – –0.0001 –0.0002 –0.0001 
 
              (–2.8260)* (3.5536)* (3.0799)* 
AR(1) 0.1666 – – 0.1310 – – 0.1390 – – – 
 
(6.4452)*     (5.0221)*     (5.3774)*       
R-squared 0.1825 0.1849 0.1951 0.2304 0.2147 0.2025 0.2148 0.1973 0.1962 0.2075 
D-W. stat 2.0206 1.6990 1.7208 2.0177 1.7438 1.7199 2.0180 1.7016 1.7154 1.7224 
F-statistic 5.0894 5.3853 5.6613 6.5003 6.1861 5.8344 5.9398 5.6489 5.6116 5.9224 
Prob(F-
statistic) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
No. of Obs. 1500 1560 1560 1500 1560 1560 1500 1560 1560 1560 
Note: All the values in the parentheses show the t-statistics. Values that are significant at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels of significance are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively. 
 
relevant coefficients are also highly significant. In model (2) investment has been included but 
again the results remain consistent and significant. Similarly in the subsequent models 
different variables have been included in alternative ways and despite of various different 
specifications the sign and significance of coefficients of governance, foreign aid and debt 
remain consistent.  This sensitivity analysis confirms the robustness of the results. 
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
This study investigates empirically the impact of foreign aid, external debt and 
governance on economic growth. Empirical model has been estimated using the fixed 
effect method for the data set of 60 developing countries (1984–2010), all the results are 
significant and according to expectations. Governance stimulates the output positively, 
foreign aid also behaves in a similar manner but the external debt has adverse impact on 
the output growth. Variety of different specification has been applied for the sensitivity 
analysis and it proves the robustness of the regression results. Developing countries are 
not only suffering from the poor quality governance, the scarcity of resources is another 
curse that is pushing the economy back into the pool of intricacy and obscurity. In order 
to finance the different development projects as well as the budget deficit, government of 
developing nations has to look for foreign aid and external debt. The results point out the 
hidden actualities of foreign aid and external debt very magnificently and it might not be 
wrong to say that external debt is a burden what put an economy into trouble. Foreign aid 
is playing a constructive job in spurring the economic activity of an economy. It is 
recommended to finance the development projects through earned revenues but if there is 
a need of more funding then government should go for foreign aid financing and must try 
to reduce the debt burden that is spoiling the whole economic activity. Developing 
countries should try to pay more attention to the issue of poor quality of governance and 
side by side they must indulge in those activities that augment the earned revenues. 
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